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If you have nothing to hide2 
1. Was Ist Aufklärung in the Age of Personal Data Monetisation? 
1.1. Enlightenment 
The 18th century Enlightenment thinkers inspired new relationships with knowledge, 
power, authority and human values. Critical thought, balancing of countervailing pow-
ers, rejection of un-scrutinised or unaccountable authority and a strong emphasis on 
human autonomy and individual flourishing are often heralded as the unassailable heri-
tage of western civilization. The narratives of empiricism (Bacon), scepticism (Hume), 
rationalism (Descartes, Voltaire, Kant) and epistemological inquiry (Kant again), as 
well as theological, political and ethical radicalism (Spinoza) have shaped the course of 
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western traditions and even evoked forms of Enlightenment fundamentalism. Without 
denying the many contradictions and inconsistencies between different strands of 
Enlightenment thought, the Digital Enlightenment Forum aims to build on the histori-
cal artefacts of critical thinking (daring to contest mainstream knowledge claims), 
countervailing powers (speaking truth to power), transparent government (as a precon-
dition for accountability) and the protection of civil liberties (as a precondition for 
individual autonomy and political participation). These values cannot be taken for 
granted, and are confronted with novel challenges in the era of Big Data and informa-
tion-driven government, commerce and science.3 The proliferation of incredibly mas-
sive searchable datasets, the increasing use of predictive analytics in almost every do-
main of public and private life and the extent to which critical infrastructure has come 
to depend on information and communication technologies (ICTs), warrant a new 
Enlightenment discourse to sustain the values we want to preserve and/or need to rein-
vent. The Age of Reason seems to slip into the Age of the Algorithm, the Age of Corre-
lation or the Age of Data-Driven Nudging. As Bateson, one of the founding fathers of 
cybernetics, would say: what is the difference that makes a difference here [1, p. 315]? 
How to reclaim the patience, the prudence, the practical wisdom and the reflective 
equilibrium that nourished the Rule of Law, in the era of hyper-connectivity and 
real time autonomic decision systems? To put it more bluntly in terms of the sub-
ject matter of this volume: Was ist Aufklärung in the Age of Personal Data Monetisa-
tion? 
1.2. The Dialectic of Digital Enlightenment 
Enlightenment remains an important reference point for the enquiries reported in this 
volume. The Enlightenment era, firmly rooted in the information infrastructure of the 
printed word, nourished the practices of systemisation, indexing and codification, as 
Bernard Stiegler argues in this volume. Our political, business and legal systems are 
rooted in Enlightenment concepts such as enforceable rights, individualism and the 
power of reason. In this world, privacy plays several important roles, protecting the 
autonomy of individuals and governing their relationships with institutions, communi-
ties and society as a whole. 
The advent of digital computing systems, networking, data mining and machine 
learning, is in tension with those concepts, while consistent with the idea of rationalis-
tic mastery over our environment, which is often associated with Enlightenment 
thought (notably that of Francis Bacon). This tension is an example of how specific 
Enlightenment ideals initiate a dialectic where their very success threatens their foun-
dations, as Adorno and Horkheimer famously argued [2] (and see also [3]). The para-
digmatic anti-Enlightenment philosopher Nietzsche framed the dialectic of Enlighten-
ment in a characteristically pithy way, which still reflects our own ambivalence. 
Enlightenment, for Nietszche, releases the individual from domination: “the priests all 
become priests with a bad conscience – and the same must be done with regard to the 
State. That is the task of the Enlightenment: to make princes and statesmen unmistake-
ably aware that everything they do is sheer falsehood”. Equally, he saw, in Enlighten-
ment’s promise of non-domination, a tool for manipulation. “The way in which the 
masses are fooled in this respect, for instance in all democracies, is very useful: the 
                                                          
3 Big data is of course not the only novel and challenging factor. We could also cite, for instance, global 
connectivity, the Internet of Things, online social networks, and cloud computing. 
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reduction and malleability of men are worked for as ‘progress’!”4 This dialectic shows 
itself today by the very control over our data that the Digital Enlightenment affords,5 
creating a resource of great value for governments and corporations who thus impose 
their own ideas of our well-being upon us, potentially manipulating and even removing 
our autonomy. 
Dynamic interconnected networks of individuals, private and public organisations, 
identities, credentials, personal and other data often demand massive and real time 
processing. Yet our social norms also evolve to accommodate these technological de-
velopments. The mindset of a digital immigrant seems at odds with that of a digital 
native [4]. To some, privacy may appear more costly, as it can be traded off for the 
benefits that follow from being highly visible to the network, while the volume of data 
available for processing makes it impossible for the individual to police effectively – 
even though, as Robert Madelin’s Foreword to this volume makes abundantly clear, 
user trust “is key to Big Data success”. 
There are substantial implications for trust and mutual expectations, as the extent 
to which individuals are capable of overseeing and foreseeing how their data are proc-
essed, shared and put to use by whom, where, and to what purpose is now unclear. 
Despite that, assumptions from the pre-digital era still govern current policy. It is be-
coming increasingly hard to track what knowledge is mined from the proliferation of 
networked data, how such knowledge will map onto individuals’ identities, and what 
consequences will follow from these matches. 
The chapters in this yearbook have been invited from not only scholars from across 
various disciplinary backgrounds, notably computer science, psychology, law and phi-
losophy, but also a number of authors involved in specific personal data management 
initiatives, and they investigate how these technologies will affect individuals with 
regard to privacy, informational self-determination, contextual integrity, and the no-
tions of personal identity and the networked self. What values do the different stake-
holders associate with and derive from personal data and individual privacy? What are 
the options for individuals and society to control the use of personal data in a digital 
world full of user-generated content, multinational service providers, smart and inter-
connected devices, and sophisticated Big Data algorithms? How can individuals and 
civil society organisations use these new technologies for their own benefit and for 
their own perception of the public benefit, for example, via the exploitation of open 
data – and, when it comes to open data, can they really exploit without being exploited? 
To what extent can increasing transparency support trust and privacy? What technical 
and social infrastructures are needed for supporting control and transparency? Can they 
be put in place without destroying the social (and commercial) value that Robert Made-
lin highlights? nd what if they can’t? To what extent must a Digital Enlightenment 
live with the monetisation of our personal data? 
2. The Value of Personal Data 
Though the title of this book speaks of The Value of Personal Data, we can no longer 
take for granted that the concept of value refers to something mental, ethical and in-
                                                          
4 These are quotes from his Nachlass, his unpublished notebooks. 
5 Though we do not necessarily agree that the proliferation of digital infrastructures can be qualified as a 
Digital Enlightenment. 
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valuable. This volume aims to confront the notion of ‘values’ in the sense of guiding 
principles for individual persons and their societies with that of ‘value’ in the sense of 
monetary value. In the chapters that follow, the incalculable worth of the value of a 
person and her data is confronted with the quantifiable worth of manipulable,6 ma-
chine-readable data that relate to an identifiable individual person. It thereby builds on 
a tension that is inherent in the Enlightenment Age, namely between reason and ration-
ality, between what must be argued and what can be calculated. It may be, that to pre-
serve the invaluable value of our personhood we need to engage with the calculable 
value of the personal data on which so many business cases in public administration 
and industry now depend. Monetisation of personal data is already a fact. To reclaim 
some degree of autonomy as an individual person, society may have to enable a person 
to anticipate how her data can be monetised and what could be the consequences of 
‘leaking’ her data:7 loss of a job, lucrative discounts, personalised surveillance, exclu-
sion from social security benefits, rejection of credit, or being registered on whatever 
blacklist. The point is not so much to provide people with a share of the profits made 
by the monetisation of personal data, but foremost, the idea is to create effective trans-
parency and control over what data are captured, created, mined and aggregated in 
order to come to grips with the usage, abuse and exchange of our data. 
2.1. Volunteered, Observed and Inferred Data 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) has initiated a series of discussions under the 
heading of Rethinking Personal Data, notably reporting on personal data as a new 
economic ‘asset class’. In its 2011 report on Personal Data: The Emergence of a New 
Asset [5], the WEF discriminated between three types of data: volunteered, observed 
and inferred data (see Fig. 1). 
Volunteered data are defined as data that individuals “explicitly share about them-
selves” through electronic media, for example, when someone creates a social network 
profile or enters credit card information for online purchases. Observed data are data 
“captured by recording activities of users” (in contrast to data they volunteer). Exam-
ples include Internet browsing preferences, location data when using cell phones or 
telephone usage behaviour. Inferred data are “data from individuals, based on the 
analysis of personal data [such as] credit scores… calculated based on a number of 
factors relevant to an individual’s financial history”. Though the categories may over-
lap, this mapping of personal data and data that may affect a person is a timely proposal 
to bring some order in the debate over the sharing of personal and unpersonal data. 
Obviously, volunteered data are indeed created by a person in the sense of her deciding 
what information to hand over for whatever reason to whichever other person, organi-
sation or software programme. Observed data, however, are in fact created by the soft-
ware that tracks and traces our online and offline behaviours: clickstream, public trans-
port, electronic payment, mobility, jogging or any type of machine readable behaviour. 
These data refer to a specific person, and are therefore personal data under EU data 
protection legislation, but they are ‘made’ by the software machines of companies or 
public administration departments. Inferred data are ‘made’ by data mining technolo-
gies, looking for patterns in the volunteered and/of observed data, that are aggregated 
                                                          
6 On the meaning of the term manipulation, see Stiegler in this volume. 
7 ‘Leaking’ refers to what the World Economic Forum calls ‘observed’ data, they are mostly behavioural 
data that register clickstream, mobility, purchasing and other data without our conscious or deliberate inten-
tion to share such data. 
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in a database. These inferred data need not refer to an identifiable person, as they may 
be statistical correlations or other patterns, mined from the anonymised data of millions 
of people. However, the fact that such patterns are not personal data does not mean 
they will not impact individual persons. Once a subset of data points match such pat-
terns, a person may be identified as one who is willing to pay a higher price, to take 
more risk, or one who is prone to develop a specific disease or inclined to aggressive 
behaviour. Though this is all about statistics, the consequences of applying such prob-
abilities to individual users are real. Protection is warranted, even when inferred data 
are not personal data [6]. 
2.2. Working Definitions 
In this volume, the authors have examined the extent to which privacy and data protec-
tion require new technological, legal and organisational architectures in the era of pro-
liferating personal data ecosystems. Since the field we are exploring is an emergent 
domain of knowledge we will start with a set of explorative definitions, to help the 
reader to navigate a pioneer’s landscape. 
The value of personal data. As already mentioned above, the value of personal 
data can be understood in two ways: as an invaluable asset that is intrinsically linked to 
the individual person, and as a quantifiable variable that can be traded against various 
types of services or even money. 
Identity. In the context of digital security and data protection, the term identity of-
ten refers to either the complete set of attributes that define an individual person or 
                                                          
8 This figure was taken from [5, p. 15], © World Economic Forum (WEF), Bain Company, and Marc Da-
vis, who developed the concepts of volunteered, observed and inferred data in collaboration with the WEF. 
 
Figure 1. The Personal Data Ecosystem: A Complex Web From Data Creation to Data Consumption.8 
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whatever data can uniquely identify a natural person. This can be said to stand for iden-
tity in the technical sense, and it relates to identification and authentication. In the con-
text of privacy and human values, identity refers to the sense of self that individuals 
develop in the course of their lives, enabling them to develop an ‘own’ personality and 
to act as a moral and legal agent. 
Privacy and data protection. The human right of privacy is usually seen as a lib-
erty or negative freedom, i.e. imposing an obligation on others not to interfere with the 
home, private and family life, and communications of a person. As a liberty, it is not 
easy to define, as definitions restrict its scope. As a human right, privacy protects 
against infringements by the state, though horizontal effect may oblige states to protect 
their citizens against privacy infringements by other citizens or private companies. Data 
protection is a set of legal norms that more strictly defines a set of rights of data sub-
jects (those to whom personal data relate) and obligations of data controllers (those 
who determine the purpose of data processing). Privacy rights prohibit infringement of 
the privacy; data protection conditions the free flow of information. Privacy protects 
the opacity of the individual; data protection warrants transparency of personal data 
processing. Though some would claim that consent is the hallmark of data protection, 
others will argue that informed consent is becoming illusive, and purpose limitation is 
the main protection offered by data protection legislation. 
Personal data ecosystems (PDE). In descriptive terms this concept refers to the 
interacting personal data processing systems (PDPSs) that have been proliferating for 
some time now. This may concern the vast data servers that store data collected by the 
National Security Agency (NSA), or the consumer data aggregated and mined by data 
brokers such as Axciom or Experian, who sell consumer profiles for marketing or 
credit rating, or those that offer public or private cloud services to either businesses or 
individual end users. It may also concern those that offer authentication services 
(trusted identities in the technical sense) or personal data management services (based 
on credentials or attributes as pseudonyms). At a higher level of abstraction, a PDE 
may include Trust Frameworks and Trust Networks that should allow, for example, 
context-aware personal data management. 
Personal data management (PDM). Though PDM is also the acronym for per-
sonal data monetisation, we use it to refer to the user-centric management of an indi-
vidual’s own personal data – facilitated by various types of architectures – to make sure 
that a person can retain a degree of control over who gets access to which of her per-
sonal data. In many ways it builds on user-centric Identity Management Systems. PDM 
can be achieved by securing one’s personal data in a digital vault (on one’s own device 
or distributed in a cloud) and the architecture may be offered by one service provider to 
all of its customers or in the form of a platform which allows individuals to connect in 
a secure way with various service providers. The bottom line is that a user’s personal 
data are not shared without their consent, or in the case of necessity (contract, a legal 
obligation, vital interests, public tasks or the legitimate interests of the data controller), 
on condition that they will not be used for other purposes than those stipulated when 
access was provided. Monetisation can be the effect of personal data management, i.e. 
if companies are willing to share part of the profits they make on the value of personal 
data with the data subject. PDM may lead to a situation where the added value services 
which are nourished by personal data will only function if data subjects can actively 
and knowingly participate in the creation of the added value, while getting their piece 
of the cake that was thus enlarged. One important issue is to what extent PDMs will 
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provide adequate control over the observed and inferred data that nourish most of the 
business cases of Big Data analytics. 
2.3. User-Centric Personal Data Management 
The basic mechanisms that the various authors in this volume explore for understand-
ing and managing this delicately balanced ecosystem are user-centric data management 
tools; methods and business models that are intended to empower the individual by 
allowing her a measure of control over her own data. This should not only concern her 
volunteered but also her observed data and the inferences made from them. User-
centric data management is of course only one solution to the problems described 
above, but it is worth considering as a focus for this enquiry, as it has the potential for 
addressing the problems while remaining consistent with the Enlightenment project of 
self-determination. Both within the regulators and within the industry the idea has been 
taken up to develop some form of personal data management as a follow-up to identity 
management. 
The vision of personal data management is quite simple; the data subject controls 
and curates data about herself (not all data, but the data she is able to collect). If anyone 
wants it, they have to ask her for it – she gives them whatever she wants to share. If she 
wishes to keep the data to herself, then she does not give out information. She can give 
a certain piece of information to one person (her doctor, say), but not another (her in-
surance broker). This is a complex process, but it is managed by software tools which 
simultaneously store or access the data (it may be distributed across various reposito-
ries), and manage the interface between data subject and data user. She can outsource 
the management of the data to other organisations, and ask them to intercede for her; 
many of the likely situations where her information is required will be too complex for 
her to want to manage, and the volume of requests may simply outpace her ability to 
monitor them personally. There are clearly issues of trust, usability and security raised 
by such an arrangement. Is it feasible? Is it limited to access management or could it 
also enable usage management? The vision is simple – its implementation is hardly so. 
How are we to understand user-centric personal data management? This issue is 
explored at the theoretical level in the chapter by Bus and Nguyen, who provide an 
abstract specification of the various relationships and positions relevant to the social 
and technical context of the new digital world as they impact on the individual and her 
self-determination. They promote the idea of context-aware personal data management, 
building on ideas from thinkers such as Kim Cameron and Ann Cavoukian (both repre-
sented in this volume) in the following terms: “Context-aware PDM (CPDM) enables 
an individual to control the access and use of her personal data in a way that gives her 
sufficient autonomy to determine, maintain, and develop her identity as an individual, 
which includes presenting aspects (attributes) of her identity dependent on the context 
of the transactions (communication, data sharing, etc.), and enabling consideration of 
constraints relevant to personal preferences, cultural, social, and legal norms. Trust-
worthy data practices are foundational to enabling Context-aware PDM.” 
Bus and Nguyen unravel this definitional statement in their chapter, but without 
anticipating their careful discussion, it is useful for us to highlight a couple of its as-
pects. It sets out an ideal for personal data management in terms familiar to students of 
the rationalist version of Enlightenment. The ideal technological solution produces 
autonomy for the individual, in particular, by allowing her to develop her identity (or 
identities), in the sense of selfhood, and to present different aspects of those identities 
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to different audiences and organisations depending on the requirements of the context 
and her own preferences (i.e. she identifies herself in a more technical sense). To get a 
beer she needs to show she is over 18 while to drive a car she needs to show that she 
has taken an appropriate test, which will clearly require a greater release of information. 
To access a web service she may be required to accept tracking and tracing, which she 
could reject by default or accept depending on certain conditions. 
This autonomy has limits. For instance, in order for an identity, in the technical 
sense, to be useful it has to serve the purposes not only of the individual but also of 
organisations demanding it. The data required to drink a beer, while disclosing minimal 
information, must be verifiable. This must inevitably stifle some of the individual’s 
options – for example, she may creatively wish to present herself as she is not (for 
example, to fake some episodes in the past). There are many reasons why this could be 
done – most obviously determining one’s own identity (for example as a good father or 
mother) is not always strongly connected to the facts. Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical 
analysis of the presentation of the self, by evoking the theatre, ipso facto evokes the 
possibility of creative reconstruction [7]. The function of memory is not the retrieval of 
facts, but rather sensemaking, which is not dependent on the strict truth of what is re-
membered. More prosaically, Dodge and Kitchin [8] have argued that the best way to 
protect personal data stores is to falsify random pieces of information so that anyone 
snooping in the store cannot be certain that a particular data item retrieved is actually 
true. Mayer-Schönberger [9] has produced a related argument that the only way to 
ensure that identities can develop in a non-pathological way is to delete information 
periodically and automatically. This does somewhat overturn the Enlightenment ideal 
for personal data management by removing human agency from the decision-making. 
There is indeed a flip side to the rationalist version of the Enlightened ideal of per-
sonal data management, which is that the collected data, even (perhaps especially) if 
curated by the data subject herself, is a valuable resource for others. Commercial or-
ganisations may pay for the right to process or use it. That at least would allow the 
individual some rights over how the information is used, but as Hildebrandt has ar-
gued [10], without transparency the individual may be unaware of how it will be used 
and what value will be extracted by the purchasing firm. How can she make an in-
formed decision to provide access? How can her supposed autonomy be reconciled 
with her profound ignorance of what is likely to happen? 
Perhaps more to the point, governments will always give themselves the powers to 
use collected data, covertly or otherwise [11]. Policing, national security and public 
health are reasons that will always be cited. And, although one wearies of the extraor-
dinarily dim, wilfully complacent and shockingly bogus argument that “if you have 
nothing to hide you have nothing to fear,” it is routinely trotted out, not only by tabloid 
newspaper editors with a vested interest in the destruction of privacy, but also by re-
sponsible public officials. It was, for instance, the response of the United Kingdom’s 
Foreign Secretary William Hague [12] in a comment about the US government’s clan-
destine PRISM surveillance programme, the existence of which was revealed (a “land-
mark event”, according to Kim Cameron in his Afterword in this volume) by a whistle-
blower in The Washington Post and The Guardian. Yet the UK Intelligence Services 
Act of 1994 allows electronic surveillance “in the interests of the economic wellbeing 
of the United Kingdom in relation to the actions or intentions of persons outside the 
British islands”, which has allegedly been interpreted as allowing the UK government 
to bug foreign diplomats to determine their negotiating positions prior to economic 
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summits [13]. These diplomats had something to hide, sure – but it is perfectly legiti-
mate to want to hide a negotiating position. 
The PRISM affair highlights an important failing of the European digital economy. 
European citizens are at risk from American snoopers because there are very few alter-
natives to US-led online services. We use Google, Facebook and Twitter because the 
European alternatives are puny in comparison. This is partly due to the first-mover 
advantage afforded by network effects, but partly it reflects the greater entrepreneurial-
ism evident in Silicon Valley, which has had the unhappy effect of giving the NSA 
easy access to ‘our’ data.9 It is probably a myth that President George W. Bush once 
declared that the trouble with the French is that they have no word for entrepreneur, but 
given the US’s commercial lead, it has the ring of truth (applied not only to the French, 
but to Europe as a whole). As demonstrated in this volume, there are plenty of options 
for the private sector to move into the space of personal data management – and this 
may be the very time to strike. 
The bottom line is simple: if we put all our data eggs in one basket, we should not 
be surprised when those interested in us make a grab for the basket. Hence we endorse 
the conclusion of Bus and Nguyen that the functioning of the edifice of personal data 
management would require appropriate norms, regulations and “trustworthy data prac-
tices”. To the extent that it provides for data protection by design it might even enable a 
win-win situation, though if it merely allows consumers to trade their data without in-
built verification of lawful and fair usage it is unclear what the advantage will be. We 
should not allow ourselves to become compromised by our own involvement in the 
monetisation of personal data in ways that undo the invaluable value of personal data. 
3. Autonomy and Heteronomy in the Era of Predictive Analytics 
As philosopher Bernard Stiegler observes, in our first Chapter, ‘Die Aufklärung in the 
Age of Philosophical Engineering’: 
And while traceability continues to expand, it seems it is mainly being used for behaviour 
profiling, and thus to increase the heteronomy of individuals rather than their autonomy. 
The combined usage of volunteered, observed and inferred data that concerns us – 
because these data refer to us and/or generate all types of automated decisions about 
us – confronts us with a novel cognitive economy. The quantity, forms and implica-
tions of privately held or publicly shared knowledge have long since reached unprece-
dented levels of accumulation, while no human mind nor any computing system could 
claim to ‘know’ the content of all the data ‘out anywhere’. Is it important, therefore, to 
reassess what it means that so much information is being processed by interacting 
computing systems whose operations are opaque to most of us and may even be hard to 
assess by those who designed them. Stiegler, in fact, describes how the grammatisation 
(discretisation) of behaviours follows up on the earlier grammatisation of spoken and 
written language, all depending on what he identifies as retention, i.e. our ability to 
retain the flux of life as a perception (primary retention), a memory (secondary reten-
                                                          
9 Though having said that, the colossal Tempora programme of the UK’s GCHQ to ‘Master the Internet’ is 
also stunning in the quantity of data and metadata it amasses, all on the basis of an innocuous loophole in the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which has allowed GCHQ’s lawyers to present a case for 
Tempora’s legality, but has also cast doubt on its democratic legitimacy. GCHQ allegedly shares sensitive 
personal information with the NSA [14]. 
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tion) and by means of technical devices that allow the storing or even the machine-to-
machine processing of information (the handwritten manuscript, the printing press, 
photographs, mass media, and now, the digital computer and the Internet; all different 
forms of tertiary retention). For a tertiary retention to make sense to us, we need to 
introject it; to make it ‘come to mind’ – otherwise it remains outside our cognition and 
cannot inform our actions. The Enlightenment Age, with its emphasis on critical think-
ing and reasoned discourse, may be understood as the age of ‘reading brain’. As 
Stiegler indicates, referring to the work of Maryanne Wolf [15], the morphology as 
well as the behaviour of a ‘reading brain’ differs substantially from brains that have not 
been trained to read and write. So, if introjection of written text is a matter of reading, 
what would be the introjection of Big Data or of predictive analytics – that altogether 
different tertiary retention? Stiegler thus raises the important question of what politics 
are involved in the introjection of digital automata that may have been processed ma-
chine-to-machine by a number of computing systems before reaching a human ‘con-
sumer’: 
Without such a politics, the inevitable destiny of the digital brain is to find itself slowly but 
surely short-circuited by automata, and thus find itself incapable of constituting a new form 
of society with other digital brains. 
The question of personal data monetisation is part and parcel of such politics: can we 
develop a personal data ecosystem that allows for the trading of personal data in a way 
that is fair and comprehensible for individual human beings – or will the architecture 
we need to enable such trading take over and replace our individual discernment? This 
is not merely a question of trusted computing in the technical sense of having a secure 
environment with the right type of encryption to authenticate access and to guarantee 
the confidentiality of the content of our personal data. It is not even the question of the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of my personal data. It is about the extent to 
which we can foresee what data derivatives we match and how this will constrain or 
enable us to develop our personal identity. Will personal data management, for instance, 
help to achieve such foreseeability? Will it re-enable a degree of autonomy or would it 
reinforce the heteronomy of individuals in the era of Big Data? 
This raises another set of questions related to the nature of personal identity. Agre 
and Rotenberg have defined the right to privacy as: 
The freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s identity [16, p. 7]. 
This definition is more abstract, but maybe more effective that the more conventional 
definitions of privacy as (1) the right to be left alone and as (2) the right to decide when, 
how, and to what extent information about oneself is communicated to others. The first 
heralds the right to privacy as a liberty; a negative form of freedom, and the second 
heralds the right to privacy as the tool of a sovereign who reigns supreme over her 
personal data; a positive form of freedom. Both definitions have their drawbacks, and 
the beauty of Agre and Rotenberg’s notion of privacy is that it acknowledges what is at 
stake with our privacy by referring to one’s identity, while it also admits the relational 
character of privacy and the need to realise that constraints are, in principle, inevitable. 
Identity is relational, it is built while interacting with others and subject to all kinds of 
constraints. This is not a new fact, but perhaps the Enlightenment Age with its empha-
sis on the individual person has come to believe its own myth: that an individual person 
with an individual identity is an entirely independent and fully autonomous being that 
admits no interference from the outside. This is a line of thought investigated by the 
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second Chapter in this volume, Personal Data: Changing Selves, Changing Privacies, 
by Charles Ess and Hallvard Fossheim. They explain: 
[T]he technologies of literacy-print correlate with high modern conceptions of the self as a 
primarily individual self – in Charles Taylor’s terms, a ‘punctual’ or radically disengaged 
self (1989). Such an individual self, understood as a rational autonomy, and the modern lib-
eral democratic state seem non-accidentally suited to each other. 
They then suggest that: 
By contrast, both orality and secondary orality correlate with more relational conceptions of 
selfhood. 
Secondary orality is a term derived from media studies, identifying certain characteris-
tics in hyperlinked digital environments that compare to those of prehistoric, oral socie-
ties. One of these characteristics is a more relational understanding of self and a less 
unified notion of identity. They highlight the vulnerability of the relational self, and 
they warn that societies cherishing the relational character of the self tend to make the 
self dependent on social hierarchies, and seem to foster non-democratic politics. 
Though this is debatable, considering the egalitarian nature of many face-to-face socie-
ties [17], it seems clear that a relational self is more dependent on its environment than 
the unencumbered self of the Enlightenment’s autonomous rational subject. This has 
major implications for privacy. According to Ess and Fossheim, societies that thrive on 
the idea of a relational self often have a negative opinion of privacy, as this is seen as 
an antisocial characteristic. They suggest that the current tendency to share and expose 
one’s identity indicates a shift from atomistic notions of an independent self to more 
relational notions of an interdependent self. This, they argue, requires a new, hybrid 
understanding of the self as both relational and autonomous. This would require a shift 
towards, for instance, Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual privacy [18]. The interesting 
question of how this relates to the monetisation and management of personal data 
within the context of the emerging personal data ecosystem remains unanswered, but in 
order to assess to what extent we can expect individual persons to effectively manage 
their personal data, we need to come to terms with the issue of individual autonomy 
and the impact of others, of technological infrastructures and of societal institutions on 
the self. Can we discuss personal data management in terms of individual consent and 
rational choice, or should we admit to the bounded rationality that forms the point of 
departure of behavioural economics? Is the rational liberal subject that forms the hid-
den premise of much talk over consent as autonomous as liberals proclaim, or should 
we admit the social nature of the self and thereby acknowledge the delicate mix of 
autonomy and heteronomy of individual persons? What does this mean for privacy: is it 
perhaps more than a private interest [19]? 
4. Privacy as a Public Good 
In this context, it is worth asking how the evolution of social norms, the development 
of technology and our normative, political and philosophical assumptions have inter-
acted to create this particular example of the dialectic of Enlightenment. The answer 
might best be illustrated by considering the perhaps unexpected tension of personal 
choice and autonomy, as it is played out in the ideological and commercial arenas 
where the subtleties of political theory are so easily lost in the noise. So let us consider 
this dialectic in action. 
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Note that there is a health warning here: the arguments presented in this section are 
not normative ones, and this is not a piece of political philosophy. This section reports 
what happens when people with political, ideological, commercial and technological 
agendas conflict in a contested and ineffectively regulated space. The point here is not 
whether one believes that privacy, as related to autonomy and identity, is a precondi-
tion for a fair and free market, as well as for a viable democracy that requires individu-
als capable of making up their own mind. If you are reading this book, you probably 
subscribe to that complex proposition. In this section we consider how, and how not, to 
establish that point against those who do not believe it, those who believe it but think 
that care in this area is unnecessary, and those who believe that it is irrelevant to some 
of the current trends in technology which have caused concerns. Obviously, some 
would claim that the argument for privacy as a public good is a normative issue, and 
reformulating it in terms of a descriptive argument hides rather than removes normative 
assumptions. For the sake of the argument, we will, however, investigate the strength 
of a liberal position that is often invoked in favour of privacy as autonomy. 
In a celebrated passage, political philosopher John Stuart Mill argued that: 
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering 
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for 
which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suffi-
cient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or to forbear because it will be better 
for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do 
so would be wise or even right [20, p. 14]. 
Let us call this the Mill Test of whether coercion (whether overt, or of the subtler 
‘nudge’ kind) is justified to prevent harm (it is often referred to as the ‘harm prin-
ciple’ [21]). It has become increasingly influential as freedom has become a prized 
political good, and now defines an area of private life where you have, in the classic 
account of Warren and Brandeis, the right to be let alone [22]. Ironically, the applica-
tion of the Mill Test specifies a space for decisional privacy, but in our networked 
society decisions are often made to sacrifice informational privacy in exchange for free 
or useful services, even though many commentators believe that to do so is hardly wise 
or right at all. In less inflammatory terms, a decision is taken to exercise one’s data 
protection rights which results in a loss of control over one’s personal data – even if 
one retains rights of control under data protection law, these rights are seldom exer-
cised and are, in practice, very hard to exercise. 
When we apply the Mill Test to a decision to relinquish control over personal in-
formation – for example by joining a social networking site (SNS), and thereby collud-
ing in the creation of a large amount of rich data about our social network and other 
aspects of our activities to the SNS owners – there is a tacit assumption made that the 
privacy that results from being invisible to the SNS benefits only the individual. Given 
that this is so, then in a ‘civilized community’ it is not acceptable to regulate SNSs by 
preventing or discouraging people from joining them in order to prevent them from 
carelessly giving their privacy away in a manner they might later regret. People can be 
informed of the potential for breaches of privacy, but if they continue to have a cavalier 
attitude towards their personal information that is their business. If privacy benefits the 
individual only, then it follows that lack of privacy may harm the individual only; the 
lack of potential for harm to others means that the Mill Test rules out any interference 
with the actions of individuals to preserve their privacy. 
M. Hildebrandt et al. / Introduction12
AU
TH
OR
  C
OP
Y
 
That analysis is shared by two usually antagonistic ideologies. Many liberals, liber-
tarians and individualists champion the Mill Test, but privacy is important because it 
protects autonomy; the ability to make informed decisions in the absence of coercion. 
Without control over access to his person, reflections, decisions, and information about 
him, an individual is not fully informed about his environment, cannot be guaranteed to 
detect or avoid coercion and cannot be authentically himself [23]. 
Against that, so-called communitarians argue that freedoms only make sense 
against the background of a culture which maintains them. Rights entail responsibilities 
to ensure that communities function properly and humanely, and when individuals 
pursue their own rights beyond a certain point, the community suffers. Although they 
are important, privacy rights can undermine community cohesion, so when a commu-
nity faces a well-documented threat (not just a theoretical one) to the common good, 
steps to curb privacy are not ruled out by the Mill Test. Etzioni lists a series of potential 
areas for intervention, including ‘Megan’s Law’, a group of laws at both federal and 
state level in the US which require the addresses of convicted sex offenders to be pub-
licly available [24]. 
Liberals and communitarians are generally in opposition, but in their joint support 
for the Mill Test, they agree implicitly that the gains of privacy accrue to the individual, 
while its costs are felt by wider society (perhaps in terms of loss of security, or lack of 
efficiency). Liberals and communitarians thus believe that privacy is a private good, 
like life, wealth and freedom. They think that unlike clean air, clean water and democ-
racy, it is not a public good whose benefits accrue to the community at large. 
This unusual consensus also finds support from those technological determinists 
who argue that the extent of privacy is a function of our deployment of information 
technology to undermine the so-called ‘practical obscurity’ which results from what 
Luciano Floridi has characterised as ‘ontological friction’ in information flow [25]. If 
technology makes it easier for information about an individual to get from A to B, and 
if that individual colludes with the deployment of that technology, then privacy is de 
facto difficult to protect, and some technological determinists – for example, Jeff Jar-
vis – argue that in that case it is socially harmful to do so [26]. 
Such determinism, rendered more plausible by the tacit assumption that the tech-
nology itself plays only a neutral role in this novel scenario, was famously expressed 
by Scott McNealy as “you have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.” Facebook CEO 
Mark Zuckerberg has also often argued that the reduction of privacy in the Web-
enabled world is solely a result of the unforced take-up of privacy-inhibiting technolo-
gies changing social norms.
10 
These arguments bring with them the unspoken implication that the technology has 
no effect on social norms, and users take up privacy-threatening technologies that are 
already and independently acceptable to them. This argument, which tends to come 
from technology companies and cyber-enthusiasts, is surely disingenuous, if not self-
serving. 
Rather, we find ourselves facing a new paradigm. When surveillance, data produc-
tion and data analysis were the prerogatives of governments and large corporations, 
individuals gained little from visibility – privacy was the right to be left alone. Data 
tended to be created in separate and extra processes – for example, data about shopping 
                                                          
10 In honour of Zuckerberg’s role in crafting this deterministic position, one author of this introduction has 
christened it ‘Zuckerbollocks’ [27]. We should make it clear that Zuckerbollocks is a populist rendering of 
technological determinism, rather than a carefully thought-out and philosophically-respectable position, and 
when we talk of technological determinism in this section we specifically refer to Zuckerbollocks. 
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habits was gleaned by market research companies asking people to fill in question-
naires. Filling in forms was tedious, and there was little incentive for consumers or 
citizens to cooperate by doing so. Demand for data exceeded supply. Now, digital 
transactions increase the supply of data by producing data as an organic by-product of 
an online transaction. A person looks at a web page, buys a book, uploads a photo, 
sends a text – the observed data recording the transaction is created naturally and im-
mediately. The massive supply of data has laid the groundwork for the design and pro-
duction of innovative services (which themselves generate even more data), and which 
not only provide value for companies and governments, but allegedly also the data 
subjects. Moore’s Law means that processing power has kept pace with this increase in 
data supply. 
So for the first time we find ourselves in a world where there are many enticing in-
centives for consumers and citizens to risk their privacy by exercising their data protec-
tion rights, and becoming visible to their networks. If we take a revealed preference 
view of belief-desire psychology, individuals’ behaviour in this new world shows that 
they (or many of them) prefer the benefits of visibility to the now rather old fashioned 
idea of being private. They assess its benefits and costs, and make a decision accord-
ingly. This may not be easy – how do you compare the immediate benefits of providing 
data about oneself with the theoretical risk, several years down the line, of its being 
misused? – but that is no different in principle from many similar discounting decisions 
we make in the ordinary course of events. The benefits can be quantified – in 2010, the 
value of free services funded by surveillance-based advertising, minus a discount for 
foregone privacy, was estimated at over €100 billion [28]. 
Liberal arguments about the value of privacy in its protection of autonomy [23] 
now seem theoretical and unrealistic as more people flock to SNSs and see benefit in 
playing with identities and self-descriptions, and exploring new types of meaningful 
interaction. Most people are reasonably clear about the artificialities of SNSs (e.g. they 
know the difference between a real-world friend and a Facebook friend), and are pre-
pared to experiment – few are completely passive consumers [29]. Loss of autonomy 
may be compensated for by increased control over identity and self-presentation. To 
many, the ability to play with identity is a real and present benefit, and the loss of 
autonomy a complex, theoretical and distant postulate of political philosophy. 
So the liberal, by assuming the application of the Mill Test to decisions about data, 
cedes so much ground to the technological determinists that it becomes difficult in the 
extreme to defend privacy.11 The liberal arguments to defend privacy tend to point to 
theoretical harms to society as a whole. For example, [30] argues cogently that privacy 
is essential to the basic values of the European tradition – self-determination, democ-
ratic participation and economic well-being. But these philosophical and normative 
arguments are not guaranteed to be accepted by opponents who constantly make the 
demand: show me another individual who has been harmed tangibly by my actions in 
consenting to allow third party access to my data. 
Although privacy is immensely important to a liberal society, classical liberalism 
will undermine itself if it cannot accede to this demand. Is there a way out of the im-
passe? 
                                                          
11 This isn’t quite true. There are arguments available that an individual’s autonomy has a social value as 
well as value to the individual (for example, it enables democracy to function more effectively). However, 
these arguments tend to rest on liberal assumptions, and so do not always appeal widely to non-liberals, and 
are not effective to defend liberalism against hostile attack. 
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Fortunately, there is. Arguments that can meet the demands of the opponent are 
readily available, although not made as often as they should be.12 
• Accountability. An individual’s autonomy has a social function – only 
autonomous persons are properly accountable. When a person’s privacy is di-
minished, the question about his responsibility for his actions becomes mud-
died – and the loser is wider society, not that person himself [19,31]. 
• Profiling. Many decisions are framed by the use of data to classify people and 
‘personalise’ (or, put another way, ‘restrict’) choices. When others forego pri-
vacy, their data can create a stereotype against which a privacy-sensitive indi-
vidual may be matched despite her attempts to maintain control [10,32,33]. 
The stereotypes can be developed from group behaviours, and need not in-
clude anything about the individual herself, except to place her in the group 
(perhaps for demographic reasons – she is a divorced executive aged 41–50 – 
or because she lives in a particular postcode or zip code area).  
• Security. Much writing on privacy assumes a security/privacy trade off. Pri-
vacy is a right, but security is a primary function of the state. Yet even if this 
trade off sometimes exists, is it the usual condition? Arguably not – a loss of 
privacy can result immediately in a loss of security when data become public, 
or are leaked [34,35]. 
• Trading data. Because data is economically valuable, there is a case for 
commodification to allow the data subject to profit alongside data processors 
[36]. Yet without the measure of control that privacy brings, asymmetries of 
knowledge would make the functioning of such a market inefficient [37]. 
Could citizens meaningfully consent to their data being exploited without any 
idea of how and in what context it will be used? 
• Credible signalling and full disclosure. New markets are being created as 
increased data lowers the costs of credible signalling. For instance, a social 
network is a good indicator of creditworthiness, so an individual could agree 
to make their SNS data available to a lender in return for a discounted interest 
rate.
13 This may help the underbanked and those without collateral. However, 
there is a danger that those who do not wish to disclose data will be penalised 
on the assumption that their data would not provide a positive signal; in the 
banking example, a privacy-aware individual would automatically be assumed 
to be uncreditworthy [38]. 
• Chilling effects. As privacy decreases, behaviour will adapt. Even in the ab-
sence of overt censorship, people will experiment and innovate less, and ex-
press themselves less freely [9]. This may be a particular effect of the recent 
revelations about PRISM. 
These various arguments all demonstrate the importance of privacy as a public or 
social good without relying on liberal premises. If any of these arguments is convincing, 
then it follows that the Mill Test does not apply to privacy, and that society may take 
steps to protect privacy even in the face of mass market behaviour which reveals pref-
erences for other goods over privacy. 
                                                          
12 This argument is made in more detail in [27]. 
13 Examples of companies that are exploring this business opportunity include Kreditech (http://www. 
kreditech.com/), Neo (https://www.myneoloan.com/) and Lenddo (https://www.lenddo.com/). 
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In fact we may go further. They basically confirm that liberal notions of purely 
autonomous individuals, communitarian celebration of collective identity and techno-
logical determinism all miss the point. Individuals are always relational; they emerge 
from the various communities in which they participate and they also co-constitute 
these communities. Information and communication technologies mediate the process 
of identity construction, but do not over-determine either individual or society. These 
arguments build on a more robust understanding of self, technology and society, ac-
knowledging the inherently relational character of privacy. 
For the user-centric data management systems considered by the chapters in this 
book, then, there are indeed important reasons why privacy protection needs to be built 
into the architectures and system designs. Personal data management should not simply 
endow the data subject with the ability to sell to the highest bidder. Many of the chap-
ters in this book discuss regulations, architectures and technologies which will begin to 
help us negotiate the tricky line between maximising the value of our data and mini-
mising our exposure to unwelcome surveillance, and to help us draw lines (either in 
law or via social norms) when immediate personal gain threatens to produce long-term 
social loss. 
5. Overview of the Chapters 
Such is the political, legal and technical background in which we find ourselves in 
2013. We are grasping to find solutions to problems we perhaps only dimly perceive – 
or worse, we are looking for problems which may not exist while missing the serious 
issues just around the corner. We do not know whether solutions should be given the 
full power of law, or whether a quick techie fix will do the trick. Meanwhile, the mar-
ket presents its own dialectic and generates the solutions for which people will pay. Is 
the market excluding large sectors of the population, and will the discourses it produces 
warp or invade public space? And are innovation and social norms in any event moving 
so quickly that it is futile for institutions to try to keep up? 
The Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2013 has collected a series of chapters ex-
ploring the idea of the value of personal data. The different stakeholders in society and 
the different scientific communities (technology, law, philosophy, social science, eco-
nomics), as well as entrepreneurs and policymakers, will have very different opinions 
and perspectives on this motive. Our intention in this book was to bring together these 
different perspectives to form a basis for inspiring and constructive discussions across 
disciplines. Most were written especially for this volume, but a small minority are re-
workings or repurposings of previously published material. 
We are also extremely grateful for a Foreword by Robert Madelin, and an After-
word by Kim Cameron. Both of these pieces place our thinking into the wider context 
of big data, its promise (Madelin) and its dangers (Cameron). How, the reader may 
think, is the poor individual to cope, tossed about in the tsunami of data, services and 
innovation that is engulfing her? Both Madelin and Cameron agree that PDM is an 
essential part of the story, and the papers in this collection go some way to filling in the 
detail. 
5.1. Part I: Background 
The chapters are divided roughly into five main groups – of course in a volume of this 
nature there is a lot of inter-group overlap and intra-group heterogeneity, which is a 
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roundabout way of saying that the editors (themselves a diverse trio) had some trouble 
deciding which chapters should go where. Part I provides a background, and continues 
with some of the themes discussed in this introduction. The two chapters in this section, 
by Stiegler, and Ess and Fossheim, have been discussed at length above. They set the 
scene for the more detailed examination of the concepts of personal data management 
and valuation in the remaining chapters. Following this opening section, four more 
follow. 
5.2. Part II: The Need for Privacy 
Part II moves from the general issues surrounding our new digital world, to the more 
particular considerations and challenges of the problem of personal data and its use and 
abuse, its protection and commoditisation. Sociology, psychology and policy are all 
explored here as we consider the ways in which the individual responds to and is 
shaped by technology. The individual wishes to determine her own identity – how can 
she use her own data to do that, and how can she control the process? Put another way: 
how do informational self-determination and privacy interlink so that each needs the 
other? 
Lizzie Coles-Kemp and Joseph Reddington’s chapter, entitled Not So Liminal 
Now: The Importance of Designing Privacy Features Across a Spectrum of Use, pushes 
beyond the mainstream of computer use to examine how the glut of personal data being 
created will affect sectors of society that are often neglected by technology markets and 
data regulators. Assumptions are made about data subjects’ cognitive abilities that are 
simply unrealistic in the general case, and much of the discussion of how the new envi-
ronment affects the autonomy of individuals is predicated on the possibility of them 
refusing to use a technology. Coles-Kemp and Reddington argue that neither of these 
optimistic assertions is necessarily true. They take a specific example – that of people 
with severe speech defects who use Augmentive and Alternative Communication sys-
tems (AAC) – in which complex problems of data storage and data use crop up that 
perhaps would not have been anticipated. Yet the solutions proposed by AAC develop-
ers do perhaps contain lessons for more widely available and applicable technologies. 
In their chapter on Privacy Value Network Analysis, Adam Joinson and David 
Houghton address the notion of privacy value head on. They use methods from net-
work analysis and the social capital literature to analyse and visualise the creation of 
value across a network. As we have noted above, there is real value for consumers 
created by networks, and any privacy-aware individual needs to make highly complex 
calculations as to how much information she can release – and even then there is an 
important question as to how informed she can possibly be about its use (a lacuna that a 
number of papers in this volume attempt to fill). Consumers generally can be disturbed 
when specific advertising practices are made clear to them (Google’s Eric Schmidt 
once famously described his own company’s policy as being “to get right up to the 
creepy line” – a notion that is in itself so creepy that it raises creepiness to the 
metalevel). Joinson and Houghton overlay techniques from value network analysis with 
ideas about managing communications at the boundary of our selves, our personal 
relationships and our group memberships to visualise notions of information exchange, 
the goals of interaction and the impacts across the network. In this way they hope to 
express, and ultimately to influence, decisions made to disclose or not disclose infor-
mation. 
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Ann Cavoukian’s chapter, The Personal Data Ecosystem (PDE): A Privacy By De-
sign Approach to the Pursuit of Radical Control, describes the technological compo-
nents of the evolving idea of a personal data ecosystem (PDE – defined earlier in this 
introduction). Cavoukian takes the idea of privacy by design (PbD) seriously – this is 
the notion that, when designing systems that will hold or otherwise deal with personal 
data, one should design it with the privacy of the data subjects as a first order feature of 
the system, as opposed to the all too common practice of designing a system that does 
everything the business model demands, and then tacking a privacy management com-
ponent onto the design as an afterthought. PbD, one would think, is an obvious way 
forward, yet it is proving strangely (or not so strangely!) difficult to promote. Cavou-
kian describes the ideal of ‘radical control’ over our personal data , which she argues 
should underlie the design of any PDE. In the absence of trust in government to resist 
pressure from large commercial players and from its own intelligence communities, 
radical control may well be the only way forward to protect individuals’ data uncondi-
tionally. Put another way, if we wish to inject privacy by design into PDEs, Cavoukian 
argues that it is essential to put control totally in the hands of the individual; if it is 
contracted out to governmental actors, we are lost. It is certainly interesting, when 
considered in the context of the rest of the chapters in this book, that many of the com-
ponents of radical control are addressed separately, which is suggestive of the grand 
sweep of the ambition of this chapter. But Cavoukian appears to argue that without 
such ambition, privacy cannot be protected in full. 
Alexander Novotny and Sarah Spiekermann’s chapter signals equal ambition, in its 
title: Personal Information Markets AND Privacy: A New Model to Solve the Contro-
versy. In company with many other chapters, Novotny and Spiekermann start from the 
extraordinary business value derived from personal data, and consider the loss of trust 
that consumers feel as their data is swapped, shared and analysed outside any apparent 
control. The control that is afforded, for example, by Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 
requires more input than the poor consumer is prepared to put into the matter. Life is 
not only not private, but it is too short to make it private. Novotny and Spiekermann 
propose a three-tier model for markets in personal data and information, in which 
money can be made but privacy also protected. The first tier contains the data subjects 
and those organisations with which they have a direct relationship. The second tier 
contains the business service providers which support the first tier operations. The third 
tier is everyone else in the market who cannot deal direct with personal data. Breaking 
markets down like this, the model is able to specify a set of rights and responsibilities 
for each actor, and technological and legal enablers for each relationship, many of 
which already exist in current regulation but which may not always be properly en-
forced. The authors recognise several challenges to their model, some technical – for 
example, the need to ensure anonymisation of data when it reaches the third tier – and 
others more practical, including global enforcement. Nevertheless, the model disaggre-
gates a number of intertwined norms and drivers in information markets, and enables 
us to think somewhat more clearly about how such markets could be designed to bene-
fit everyone. 
5.3. Part III: Architectures for PDMs and PDEs 
Part III brings together papers which describe potential architectures at a relatively high 
level of abstraction. Here, we look not at proposed systems but at types of technology, 
considering what issues they raise and what problems can be solved when we consider 
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the functional units within systems and the relations between them. What are the prop-
erties that systems will need in order to foster privacy or to support flexible, informed 
consent? 
Online Privacy: Towards Informational Self-Determination on the Net, the chapter 
by Simone Fischer-Hübner et al. decries the current status of online privacy provision 
and the way in which we have sleepwalked into a world where privacy is routinely 
compromised in order to fund free services such as search and social networking sup-
port. Informational self-determination appears to have been lost in the rush to exploit 
and monetise personal data. The chapter, an updated version of a manifesto written and 
published in 2011, reviews the state of the art in privacy provision, and argues that 
current PETs lag behind the progress made in unlocking the meaning in data, and often 
fall down on important characteristics such as usability and scalability. No wonder 
demand appears to be low. They identify a series of challenges, including introducing 
transparency about the use of data and the risks to privacy, and the provision of worka-
ble tools. Their third challenge is identity management systems that undo information 
asymmetries and restore control of identifying information to the individual, and this 
may well be a crucial and neglected part of the picture. Their ten recommendations for 
regulatory change, and four recommendations for further research, set out a manifesto 
which puts the individual at the centre of data management. 
Johannes Buchmann et al. focus on online social networks in their chapter Per-
sonal Information Dashboard: Putting the Individual Back in Control. The self-
explanatory title indicates their approach of providing intuitive visualisations and 
automatic tools for bringing together data from a range of sources to allow the user to 
understand the nature of the footprint she makes across the range of her online identi-
ties – a step toward the transparency which is called for by Fischer-Hübner et al. Tech-
niques such as machine learning and correlation models allow the presentation of op-
tions for lowering privacy risk (assuming that is what the individual wants). If she does 
not, then at least she is informed about the risks to privacy that she runs. Buchmann et 
al. set out in detail an architecture including a series of privacy-enhancing features and 
components to calculate current levels of privacy and to aid in decisions about what to 
make public. 
Uninformed or unconditional consent is a problem identified by both Fischer-
Hübner et al. and Buchmann et al. Edgar Whitley contributes a study of technical 
methods for supporting informed consent in his chapter Towards Effective Consent-
Based Control of Personal Data. Consent is a cornerstone of existing data protection, 
although as Whitley shows, current information systems tend to treat it as a simple 
concept, a black box that either allows or disallows the processing of data. However, as 
a matter of fact, our views of how our data should be accessed and used are likely to be 
more nuanced in a real-world context. Furthermore, consent needs to be informed, yet – 
as a number of papers in this collection make clear throughout – it is far from estab-
lished that a typical data subject is genuinely informed about what goes on, given the 
quantity of data floating around cyberspace and the sheer complexity of the various 
transactions in which it is central. Indeed, many institutions engineer their interactions 
with data subjects so that consent decisions are skewed, creating the illusion of in-
formed consent. Does too much hang on the concept of consent, then? Whitley ex-
plores the possibility of a more dynamic and user-centred notion of consent supported 
by technology, but informed by wider social science research. 
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5.4. Part IV: Other Sources of Data 
Part IV is a digression which connects with our main theme through the use of data. 
We have focused, in this introduction, on data about an individual, whether volunteered, 
observed or inferred. In managing her own data, the individual is in general likely to be 
using data she herself has generated, yet this is dwarfed in quantity by data held by 
others (banks, supermarkets, energy companies). Add to this the extra data to which 
she arguably has a right (government data), which is relevant to her, if not directly 
about her (data about her local community, schools, roads, transport timetables), and 
suddenly her PDE looks very rich and valuable to her personally – if she can get hold 
of that data and use it effectively. 
The push toward open data, which has developed enormous momentum in a very 
short space of time [39], creates another source of valuable data about the communities 
in which the individual lives and works. Open data, machine readable and online under 
highly liberal licences, can be exploited for any purpose, and it is hoped will revolu-
tionise government and commerce. New innovative services will be built on the back 
of open data stores, and will be part of the big data story that Robert Madelin’s Fore-
word looks forward to. However, open data, with the consequent lack of control that 
this implies, brings its own issues to the individual as well. No government would 
publish personal data as open data, but how about open data derived from personal data 
(aggregated or anonymised)? How about open microdata? The law here is somewhat 
untested, and two papers explore the interesting nexus between open data and personal 
data from a legal perspective. A third looks at the provision of data about individuals to 
those individuals by business. 
Ugo Pagallo and Eleonora Bassi, in their chapter Open Data Protection: Chal-
lenges, Perspectives and Tools for the Reuse of Public Sector Information, consider the 
relation between personal data and open data, considering the large amount of public 
sector information (PSI) which is derived from personal data, such as registrations of 
vehicles or land. They stress the real possibility of a “divorce” between rights to data 
and data protection, then explore the role of privacy by design as a marriage guidance 
counsellor might. There are several mechanisms, including privacy impact assessments 
and anonymisation techniques, which individually may not be sufficient to prevent a 
split, but which in aggregate may allow progress; they also would wish to include the 
notions of control and sensitivity to user preference that several authors have already 
advocated. They argue that, in the right regulatory and technical context, privacy and 
openness are not in a zero sum game. 
Katleen Janssen and Sara Hugelier’s chapter Open Data: a New Battle in an Old 
War Between Access and Privacy examines the same question from a more historical 
perspective, looking at how law has developed to help us balance rights to information 
with the rights to control, suppress or filter information which seem to constitute the 
positive privacy right. The drivers for freedom of information and open data seem very 
different – FoI mechanisms are generally seen as a kind of redress or remedy following 
a reasonable request for information that has been denied, while open data is a positive 
decision to release data. One does detect arguments about rights to data within the open 
data movement, but, in general, innovation and growth seem to be the main political 
drivers. Indeed, rights to privacy appear to be much more fully developed in law than 
rights to information. Janssen and Hugelier revisit older law resolving conflicts be-
tween transparency and privacy to gain insights into the potential for conflict in a world 
of open data. 
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Sir Nigel Shadbolt reviews the UK government’s midata initiative, working with 
the private sector to give data subjects access to the data that has been collected about 
them, in his chapter Midata: Towards a Personal Data Revolution – a title which 
shows the level of ambition for this programme. Data protection law guarantees an 
individual access to the information about her, but midata aims to make that routine. As 
with open data – a programme with which midata has much in common – there is no 
specific target to aim at. Midata is intended to stimulate new markets, and it is envis-
aged that individuals could gain a lot of value simply by visualising and then adapting 
their own consumption patterns. Several case studies are described, such as energy use, 
which in the era of smart grids, high energy costs and concern about the environment 
looks like a potential winner. The legal context of midata is complex, and Shadbolt 
describes the different approaches of the UK, the EU and the US. The midata initiative, 
like open data, provides another piece of the PDM jigsaw – we need technology to 
manage our data, but how much more powerful that model will be if we can secure 
access to some of the extremely rich data about us and our environment held by other 
organisations. 
5.5. Part V: Personal Data Management: Examples and Overview 
It is surprising how often a book on technology policy makes assumptions and lays 
down the law in an abstract way, independent of actual developments. Equally, it is 
also often the case that a particular form of technology is taken by commentators to be 
the paradigm for future developments, only for both it and the commentaries to be 
made obsolete by next year’s wonder. It is of course hard to make a book on technol-
ogy future-proof, but we hope that the debates within these covers will resonate beyond 
the situation at the time of writing in the summer of 2013. 
To that end, we invited a number of key players in the field of user-centric per-
sonal data management to write chapters describing their views of the field, how we 
have got to where we are, and where we might go in the future. In particular, we asked 
these authors to set out what systems, methods, tools or formalisms they had imple-
mented to help answer the reader’s obvious question: what is out there now? Of course 
at the time of writing we cannot know the future, but we have sampled the present, and 
in future years readers will be able to consider how far such systems have been influen-
tial. For now, these chapters provide a level of context which allows the reader to un-
derstand some of the sometimes very abstract discussions which occur throughout the 
book, and to get a sense that the politics of this area are very much current. 
Carolyn Nguyen et al. look at the collection of information by businesses in their 
chapter A User-Centered Approach to the Data Dilemma: Context, Architecture and 
Policy. They point out the dilemma that regulation to protect the individual may 
threaten the free flow of information, dampening innovation and undermining compa-
nies’ business models, and argue that the way round this dilemma is itself technological. 
They describe an architecture to handle metadata which will associate user preferences 
and permission with data, allowing users the flexibility to change their policies and 
consider unanticipated uses of their data. The core of their chapter is empirical work 
carried out by Microsoft (the affiliation of the authors) to understand user attitudes 
toward personal data, identity and trust – this is particularly welcome, as there is a 
surprising lack of such empirical work being used directly in system design or, as in 
this chapter, the principles that form the framework for fair use of data. The metadata 
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architecture is intended to allow data to flow, but with the privacy policies of the data 
subjects alongside it, with the aim of circumventing the ‘data dilemma’ described ear-
lier. 
Martin Kuppinger and Dave Hearns describe their vision for Life Management 
Platforms (LMPs), whose purpose is clearly signalled in the subtitle of their chapter 
(adapted from a previously published report) Control and Privacy for Personal Data. 
An LMP is a means of consolidating data from various sources, especially sensitive 
data, and Kuppinger and Hearns argue that we can go beyond current notions of per-
sonal data stores in terms of the flexibility of support for security and privacy. A ‘per-
sonal domain’ of data is the metaphor in which ideas of minimal disclosure and reten-
tion of control are explored. The authors set out their business model which, if feasible, 
promises to open up an interesting space for solutions to appear, although they remain 
aware that there are still many inhibitors which could suppress the sector. 
William Heath et al. have a similar agenda, described in their chapter Digital 
Enlightenment, Mydex and Restoring Control Over Personal Data to the Individual, in 
which they describe the Mydex system in the context of an idiosyncratic but undenia-
bly recognisable history of the drivers of the erosion of privacy by technology. Like 
Kuppinger and Hearns, Heath et al. are keen to establish the possibility of a feasible 
business model for personal data management systems, in their case based on a ‘Cath-
erine wheel’ model (a type of firework where a series of separate, simultaneous igni-
tions drive the firework round) where benefits are seen for the individual and the or-
ganisation, as well as contributing to the economy of volunteered personal information. 
Mydex is a social enterprise in the UK which aims to develop tools to help people 
realise the value of their personal data online while also supporting informational self-
determination, and Heath et al. describe their own system, while welcoming the growth 
of a vibrant sector in which there are many players and many alternatives. They de-
scribe the architecture and design of Mydex, both in functional terms but also with a 
historical perspective, showing how their community prototype led to particular issues 
and drove particular solutions. The historical, almost Hegelian, perspective of this 
chapter gives a strong sense of how hard it will be to provide a futureproof roadmap for 
the development of personal data ecosystems. 
To conclude this section, Jacques Bus and Carolyn Nguyen consider the state-of-
the-art range of practical examples in the field (including examples from other chapters 
in this book), and in their chapter, Personal Data Management – A Structured Discus-
sion, they abstract away from the complexities to produce a framework for considering 
how to frame the debates about the use of personal data. Many basic terms are defined, 
including – as noted above – personal data management, and a reference model for 
representing the requirements of context-based PDM, which requires the basic infra-
structure, the elements which allow management of data, and the elements that allow 
interaction between the user and external parties. From this reference model, Bus and 
Nguyen work to create a framework which proposes a set of relations in which trust 
can be negotiated and placed accurately and rationally. The proposal is intended to 
support and promote dialogue and discussion without necessarily presupposing particu-
lar solutions or market structures. Nevertheless, even the creation and support of such a 
trust network would already be a long way along the road from the current state of 
exploitation and ignorance to the radical control of Cavoukian, or the defined and en-
forced rights of Novotny and Spiekermann. 
M. Hildebrandt et al. / Introduction22
AU
TH
OR
  C
OP
Y
 
6. Research Agenda 
It may seem that we fully endorse the idea of user-centric Personal Data Management, 
even though this does not imply that we would necessarily endorse user-centric Per-
sonal Data Monetisation. At this point in time, however, the editors do not agree on 
whether PDM will enlighten us. There are worries about the further ‘datafication’ [9, 
p. 73 ff.] of personal identity, increasing discretisation and commodification of invalu-
able and untradeable dimensions of human agency and concerns about slipping from 
PDM as ‘management’ to PDM as ‘monetization’. What we do endorse, however, is 
further research into the potential of PDM for user empowerment. That PDM will 
achieve the redressing of power imbalances between the ‘owners’ of Big Data and the 
individuals they apply to cannot be taken for granted, and such research should also 
raise the question of what problems cannot be solved by means of data management 
and what problems may be created or reinforced by developing tools and frameworks 
to manage one’s data. So we end with a cross-disciplinary research agenda of three 
pivotal questions: 
1. What problems can current models of PDM solve? 
2. What problems cannot be solved by PDM systems? 
3. What new problems might be created by effective employment of PDMs? 
This is not the place to answer these questions, precisely because this will require 
both empirical investigation and philosophical reflection. As to the first question, we 
need to investigate the difference and similarities between identity management and 
personal data management and the extent to which PDM facilitates access to and/or 
usage of personal data. Does PDM provide possibilities of profile transparency, ena-
bling users to foresee how advertisers, law enforcement, potential employers, credit 
providers and insurance companies will ‘rate’ them? As to the second question, as in 
the case of identity management, it is important to flesh out whether PDM helps in 
ensuring purpose specification and purpose limitation, and whether it provides intuitive 
transparency regarding third party access and usage. How does PDM relate to the novel 
rights of data portability and the right to be forgotten? Can PDM help in providing 
control over observed and inferred data or is this an illusion in the era of Big Data? If 
so, what does this mean in an age where algorithms increasingly inform a host of deci-
sion systems that run on observed and inferred data and hardly require volunteered 
data? Does PDM protect against the application of inferred profiles that have been 
derived from anonymised and/or aggregated data, or does this fall outside its scope? As 
to the third question, to what extent does PDM require root identities that are ‘real 
identities’, thus incentivising increased use of real identities to gain access to all kinds 
of services that are now easily accessible by means of fake identities? Does PDM ig-
nore the maxim that trust does not scale; would it make us dependent on trust frame-
works and vulnerable to the volatility of high frequency trading with personal data? 
Might PDM turn our indeterminate personal identity into something that can be meas-
ured and mined, thus inviting us to participate in the process of monetisation of our 
behaviour? 
The only correct answer will be: ‘it depends’. On how we engineer, design and ne-
gotiate existing and emerging personal data ecosystems and on how we integrate them 
into our life world. How we arrange for countervailing powers between Big Data 
‘owners’ and individual persons. The idea of countervailing powers is another Enlight-
enment idea, going back to Montesquieu. This volume is a call to scrutinise the various 
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types of PDM that are proposed, to develop new ways to empower individual persons 
and to reinvent the checks and balances of constitutional democracy in the face of 
novel knowledge asymmetries. 
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